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Abstract  
An important wave of anti-austerity protests has swept across Western Europe in recent years.  
We can thus distinguish between three different types of protest occurring in Western Europe 
recently: (1) “old” issue protests: relating to the trade union and labour movement; (2) “new” 
issue protests: relating to culture and identity issues; (3) anti-austerity protests: emerging 
directly in reaction to austerity measures and cuts enacted in the current period. Following 
previous literature, we hypothesise that anti-austerity protests have attracted a new 
constituency to the streets and that they will be different from both “old and “new” protests in 
terms of their social composition, value orientations, and action repertoires. We expect anti-
austerity protesters to be on the whole younger, and in more precarious working conditions; to 
be more concerned with economic over social issues, but also to be considerably less 
institutionalized and embedded in organizational networks and to have lower experiences of 
previous extra-institutional participation. We test these hypotheses by analysing a unique and 
novel dataset containing data from over 10,000 protestors from 72 demonstrations (2009-
2013). Our results lend broad support to our hypotheses with the exception of the idea that 
“precarity” forms a new social base for anti-austerity protests.  
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Introduction 
Western European countries are still struggling with economic crisis, particularly high 
levels of unemployment and lowered purchasing power/living standards. Commentators 
across both sides of the Atlantic bemoan the emergence of a “Lost Generation” of youth. As 
citizens try to cope with the effects of negative economic conditions, attention has also been 
drawn to the potential social and political effects of the recession (Bermeo and Bartels 2014; 
Clarke and Heath 2014; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Lim and Laurence 2015). One type of 
possible negative effect of economic hardship is the decline of activism and protest around 
“new” issues such as the environment as individual return to bread-and-butter issues in times 
of economic crisis (Giugni and Grasso 2015). If citizens need to struggle with working 
overtime to keep a job or have to search for a new job, or deal with the array of difficulties 
resulting from economic hardship, they will have less time and resources to engage in 
political action to support wider moral causes such as those espoused by “new” movements.   
The “new social movement” paradigm emphasises the primacy of struggles 
surrounding questions of culture and identity – such as ecology, feminism, LGBT rights, anti-
nuclear, etc. – over questions of socio-economic equality and the redistribution of resources in 
post-industrial societies (Giugni and Grasso 2015). According to this paradigm the traditional 
labour-capital struggle linked to trade unions and the labour movement had become less 
prominent relative to “new” struggles in the post-war period. Recently and important wave of 
anti-austerity protests has swept across Western Europe in recent years and has been widely 
documented by students of social movements (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012; Fominaya and Cox 
2013; Gamson and Sifry 2013; Della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Ancelovici 2015; Della Porta 
2015; Giugni and Grasso 2015; Ancelovici, Dufour et al. Forthcoming; Fominaya and Hayes 
Forthcoming).  These events have brought back questions of inequality and the distribution of 
resources in advanced industrial societies. 
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While the experience of economic difficulty can certainly be understood to push 
people away from protesting in favor of wider moral causes such as animal rights and against 
nuclear energy, tough economic conditions can on the other hand be seen to generate 
grievances which people may seek to redress through political participation, and, in particular, 
protest (Grasso and Giugni 2013; Grasso and Giugni 2015). The economic crisis may provide 
the political space and motivations for the mobilization of those seeking to criticize what are 
perceived to be unjust patterns of wealth distribution in advanced capitalist democracies and 
to draw attention to the fact that not all sectors of society bear the costs of economic crisis 
evenly.  In particular, scholars such as Della Porta (2015) and Martin (2015) have emphasized 
the importance of the “precariat” as the new agents of protest in times of austerity.  These 
accounts build on some of the insights of accounts of the emergence of a new cleavage 
between winners and losers of globalization or modernity (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012; Hutter 
2014) with the focus being on the progressive potential of new cleavages as opposed to the 
reactionary potential for xenophobic and anti-immigrant claims.  
However, while the economic crisis might have been the spur for political 
mobilization and the focus of anti-austerity movements’ rhetoric, it is not clear whether those 
people with the most serious grievances to redress actually engaged in protest action of this 
sort. An alternative to voicing discontent is of course dropping out from politics altogether. 
According to a resource-based interpretation, those hardest hit by economic recession are also 
those most likely to exit the political sphere and withdraw from political engagement. It is 
only those who are relatively insulated from financial hardship who may have the resources 
(whether economic or social) necessary to voice their concerns and engage in political action. 
We can distinguish between three different types of protest occurring in Western 
Europe in recent years: (1) “old” issue protests: relating to the trade union and labour 
movement; (2) “new” issue protests: relating to culture and identity issues; (3) anti-austerity 
6 
 
protests: emerging directly in reaction to austerity measures and cuts enacted in the current 
period. Based on theoretical arguments in the literature, we hypothesise that anti-austerity 
protests have attracted a new constituency to the streets. We test this through the analysis of a 
unique dataset containing data from over 10,000 protestors from seventy-two large-scale 
demonstrations taking place between 2009 and 2013 across Western Europe.  Our results 
support our hypotheses. The main exception is the idea that “precarity” forms a new social 
base for anti-austerity protests: all three types of protests are disproportionately drawn from 
upper middle class professions.  In the context of this special issue this paper will provide 
evidence showing the extent to which austerity movements show continuity or change from 
both old and new social movements and the extent to which they are novel modes of 
organization for challenging the new hegemonic structures.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the first part we review the 
literature and outline the relevant theoretical dimensions for comparing the constituencies of 
anti-austerity, “old” and “new” movement participants. In the next section we discuss our data 
and operationalisation. We then move to discussing our results from multi-level models which 
take into account the clustered nature of the data. In the last section we discuss the 
implications of our results in relation to the literature and wider theoretical developments.  
 
Theory and Previous Research 
Grievances, Deprivation, and Political Protest  
The rise of anti-austerity protests has brought to the fore a long-standing question: Does 
deprivation lead to an increase or a decrease in protest participation? Early grievance theories 
of social movements emerging out of the collective behavior and crowd-control literature 
have been historically dismissed in favour of resource-based, political process, and framing 
approaches (McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Tarrow 1996; Buechler 2004; 
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Snow 2004). These mobilization models, which emphasize the importance of resources, 
political opportunities, the construction of political problems and ideological identification for 
the development of political solidarity and the organizational structures necessary for political 
action and mobilization, have since then become the mainstay of social movement analysis 
(McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996). The key reasons for this shift in focus were that while 
groups may be relatively deprived, they first need to realize, or perceive this, and also see 
themselves as social agents able to mobilize and effect political change, generally through 
membership of a political group or organization (McAdam 1982; McAdam 1986). In the 
absence of the construction of grievances and relative deprivation as social or political 
problems which can be redressed through political action, and without the organizational 
structures, resources, and political opportunities necessary to mobilize and effect political 
change, the experience of economic hardship or other forms of disadvantage on their own are 
unlikely to lead to political participation. According to this line of argument, the experience of 
economic recession, and more specifically, the costs and pressures experienced by individuals 
suffering economic hardship, are more likely to push them to exit political engagement, rather 
than mobilize them to action.   
 In line with this, the post-materialism thesis (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 
and Catterberg 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005) suggests that the experience of relative 
economic security during the early years of socialization leads to the development of values 
which emphasize self-actualisation and aesthetic, moral and socially liberal over materialist 
ones. In turn, post-materialist values are understood to spur people to anti-state “elite-
challenging” political action such as demonstrating, joining boycotts, signing petitions and 
participation in new social movements. According to this theory, it is the opposite of the 
experience of economic hardship – material security – which leads to political participation 
and to the formation of those types of values emphasizing self-expression and universal moral 
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causes which are seen to be conducive to protest participation. As such, one would expect 
higher levels of participation amongst those individuals which grew up during relatively 
affluent times and lower levels of political participation amongst those individuals – from the 
youngest generations – who are currently experiencing their “formative years” (Mannheim 
1928) during economic crisis.  
 However, it could also be suggested that the experience of hard times could lead 
individuals to focus attention on economic inequalities and the human costs these exert on 
fellow citizens. In turn, this could foster support for redistributive policies and welfare support 
measures as a means to defend fellow human beings from the worse effects of poverty. 
Support for these policies could presumably spur individuals to political action. Engagement 
in social movements would further reinforce the social understanding of hardship and 
deprivation as resulting from human, chosen political arrangements which can be altered 
through political intervention. Additionally, tough economic times can also be seen to provide 
the basis for political solidarity and identification with kindred social others going through 
similar experiences and struggling against common enemies, leading people to mobilize 
through collective action.  Given these contradictory theories, it therefore remains a puzzle as 
to whether deprivation leads people to engage in protests and, if so, under which 
circumstances, and particularly whether more resource-poor groups are more likely to engage 
in protests around anti-austerity issues compared to other, “new” or “old” issues.  
 
The Evolution of Protest Participation  
Initially understood as – often irrational – outbursts of anger from disorderly crowds, political 
protest has become mainstream in advanced industrial democracies (Van Aelst and Walgrave 
2001). The rise of protest and other extra-institutional repertoires including protest 
participation in social movement organizations is seen as one of the major changes in the 
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participation patterns of Western publics since the 1960s (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; 
Topf 1995; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002; Norris 2002). Extra-institutional participation is 
seen to be in continuous expansion as a result of the entry into the political arena of younger, 
more highly educated and protest-prone cohorts since the mid-to-late 1960s (Barnes and 
Kaase 1979). Novel channels of participation are seen to have flourished in what has been 
heralded as the “social movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) developing out of the 
student revolts of Mai 1968. Those participatory repertoires – marches, rallies, 
demonstrations, occupations, sit-ins, and other forms of public protest – once perceived to be 
the sole remit of “anti-state rebels” (Norris, Walgrave et al. 2005) are said to have become 
widespread and “normalized” (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001) in contemporary Western 
democracies.  
 Many scholars explain the rise in protest action on the basis of the rise of post-material 
values amongst new generations. Indicative of this line of argument is Inglehart and 
Catterberg (2002: 302) where the link is clearly presented: “as younger, better-educated, and 
more post-materialist cohorts replace older ones in the adult population, intergenerational 
population replacement will tend to bring a shift toward increasingly participant publics”. For 
Norris (2002: xi), the rise of protest and other extra-institutional modes of actions heralds a 
“democratic phoenix”  with young citizens in particular  shifting from “the politics of 
loyalties” to “the politics of choice”; from “citizen-oriented” to “cause-oriented” repertoires 
of political participation.  In the future, protest participation is understood to continue to rise 
in post-industrial nations since younger more “cognitively mobilized” and post-materialist 
generations participate via this repertoire (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart and Catterberg 
2002). There is evidence that protest has continued to rise due to inter-generational 
replacement (Jennings and Van Deth 1990; Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and 
Catterberg 2002; Norris 2002).  Given these claims in the literature, one would expect that the 
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profile of demonstrators around “new” or post-material issues should be relatively much more 
young that of “old” bread-and-butter issue protests. Socialization and political generations 
outlooks (Mannheim 1928) would suggest that the period of one’s coming of age should be 
most important for the development of values. In line with this, the youngest generations, 
currently coming of age in the context of crisis, should be the most likely to engage in anti-
austerity protests.  In the next section, we turn to outlining other factors that are important for 
protest participation, before moving on to highlighting, in the final section of this literature 
review, how these factors might vary for protests around different issues.  
 
The Determinants of Protest Participation  
Social characteristics such as gender and generation are generally understood to have an effect 
on someone’s likelihood to protest. Research tends to find that young people and men protest 
more (Schussman and Soule 2005; Grasso 2013; Grasso 2016) and that members of younger 
generations coming of age since the 1960s are also more likely to protest (Inglehart and 
Catterberg 2002). However, new research shows that once the appropriate age-period-cohort 
analysis methods are applied it is only the 1960s-70s generation that stands out as highly 
participatory in protest (Grasso 2011; Grasso 2014; Grasso 2016). 
 Many scholars tend to see resources as instrumental to participation – particularly 
those coming from the resource mobilization approach: people with higher levels of education 
and those from the middle classes are seen to have more resources (Brady 1995; Verba, 
Schlozman et al. 1995). However, grievance theory spells out an alternative mechanism: that 
it is those with the least resources – those who have the least to lose – that will be more likely 
to protest in society (Piven and Cloward 1977; Buechler 2004; Snow, Soule et al. 2005). 
Following this perspective, one way in which grievances have been understood is in terms of 
deprivation – whether relative or absolute. Being from the working class, for example, can be 
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seen as a proxy for absolute deprivation, but grievances can also be understood in relative 
terms, in relation to some kind of reference group – either oneself at other times (including 
expectations of oneself in the future that are no longer likely – e.g. loss of savings or a home 
during economic crisis) or some other group of people. This type of grievance is probably 
better measured through subjective political attitudes e.g. satisfaction with democracy and 
evaluations of economic situation in the present vs the future etc.  Politicization of social 
cleavages in the public sphere is crucial for inequalities to be socially understood as 
grievances. In a society that did not recognise inequality as problematic – e.g. in feudal times 
– being of a lower socio-economic status could not be understood as a grievance. In particular 
for protest and social movement participation, there are notable historical examples of 
participation by disenfranchised groups such as workers protesting for better work conditions, 
protests by the unemployed, immigrants, and most, recently, anti-austerity movements (Piven 
and Cloward 1977; Tilly 1978; Buechler 2004; Giugni and Grasso 2015). Historically, protest 
was one of the few repertoires of action open to the disenfranchised and the poor. Strikes, 
picket lines, and occupations of factories also played a similar role. However, new social 
movements are seen to be different to previous social movements in terms of their social 
bases – attracting well-connected and resource-rich individuals such as post-materialists and 
socio-cultural specialists, not just the traditional working classes (Eggert and Giugni 2015).  
Moreover, the effect of unemployment is unclear. Biographical availability theories suggest 
that unemployed people are more likely to be mobilized given fewer commitments and greater 
amounts of time (McAdam 1986). However, it should be noted that the causal mechanism 
could also be operating in the other direction with protest having ‘biographical effects’ on 
protesters leading to non-traditional choices and irregular work histories (McAdam 1999; 
Giugni and Grasso 2016). Research has shown that some unemployed people are more 
resource-rich, preferring unemployment in the face of poor job alternatives (Dunn, Grasso et 
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al. 2014). This in turn might attenuate the wider negative effects of losing a job and having a 
restricted network as a result of being out work (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1933). 
 Political values are also seen as important to participation (Dalton 1996; Norris 2002; 
Verba et al. 1995). Research shows that more left-libertarian individuals are more likely to 
engage in protest but  it remains unclear whether it is support for economic left values as 
opposed to socially libertarian values that leads to this effect (Inglehart 1977; Kaase and 
Marsh 1979; Kitschelt 1988; Kriesi and Wisler 1996). In particular, the post-materialism 
thesis (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 1996; Norris, Walgrave et al. 2005; Welzel 2012) sees 
libertarian, self-expressive values as fundamental to participation.  
 Mobilization and recruitment through previous political activism and/or associational 
networks are crucial factors (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; 
McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Norris 2002; Diani and McAdam 2003; Schussman and 
Soule 2005; Diani 2015) . However, even here is it unclear whether mobilization occurs 
primarily through associational memberships or rather through other types of more 
mainstream political action. It is also unclear whether individuals are mobilized through 
participation in any type of political activity (i.e. institutional or extra-institutional) or 
primarily through other modes of extra-institutional participation, or even still whether it is 
the level of commitment and frequency of action which is the most important factor 
(Saunders, Grasso et al. 2012).  
 
The Importance of Issues 
In this paper we aim to unravel what factors distinguish between participants in different 
types of protest rather than simply examine the extent to which different factors lead 
individuals to protest or not. As such we examine ways in which “old”, “new” and anti-
austerity protests differ in their social composition, value orientations, and action repertoires. 
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Old social movements are understood to revolve around questions of socio-economic 
equality, the distribution of resources, the trade union movement, and the labour-capital 
struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class. In contrast to this picture, Melucci 
(1989) theorized new social movements as emerging out of one section of the middle class 
(those in socio-cultural professions) challenging the other section that is in power (mainly 
managerial, economic, political).  Therefore, new social movements are understood as 
challenges over values as opposed to questions of class and economic resources. “Old” 
movements are therefore defined as those struggling for socio-economic issues, whereas 
“new” movements are those struggling for wider moral causes such as the environment, anti-
nuclear, women’s rights, LGBT rights, etc. Recently, a new wave of “anti-austerity” 
movements has emerged across advanced democracies, from the 15M/Indignados movement 
in Spain to Occupy in America and the UK  where UK Uncut and other anti-cuts coalitions 
formed, to the constellation of movements against spending cuts emerging across Europe and 
particularly the Southern European nations hardest hit by the crisis. These anti-austerity 
movements are those emerging in direct reaction to the recent economic crisis and against the 
austerity policies of many governments across Western Europe. For some, these movements 
are a resurgence of the wave of protest of the late 1990s Global Justice Movements 
(Fominaya and Cox 2013)  As such, the protests occurring in Western Europe between 2009-
2013 can be divided into three main types: those around old issues, those around new issues, 
and those emerging directly against economic crisis and austerity.  
 In particular, new social movement theory has stressed the difference between new 
movements based on cultural and identity conflicts – emerging since the 1960s – in contrast to 
the old social movements based around socio-economic equality, trade-unions, Marxist-
Leninst politics, and the labor-capital struggle (Touraine 1971; Touraine 1981; Offe 1987). 
According to this body of literature, new social movements share a number of characteristics 
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in terms of social bases, organizational forms, action repertoires, and so forth, setting them 
apart from other, older movements, and particularly the labor movement based around trade 
unions. From this perspective, that which distinguishes old from new social movements most 
clearly is their different social bases. 
 Kriesi (1989) famously argued how “social-cultural specialists”, that particular 
segment of the emerging “new middle class”, displayed left-libertarian values. Various studies 
have shown that this social category is over-represented in new social movements (Kriesi and 
Van der Praag 1987; Kriesi 1989; Kriesi 1993). Moreover, the new middle class would also 
be more inclined to engage in the protest activities organized and mobilized for by social 
movements and social movement organizations: “social-cultural specialists are slightly more 
likely than unskilled workers to vote in national elections but far more likely to use protest 
activities to articulate their claims (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012). Kitschelt (1988) termed used 
the term “left-libertarian” to denote economic leftism coupled with social libertarianism.  In 
particular, the social libertarian-authoritarian, not simply the economic left-right, value 
dimension seems an important consideration for studying engagement with new social 
movements and protest activism. More recently,  Della Porta (2015) sees “the precariat” as 
the major social base of anti-austerity protests.  
 Given the literature on the differences between the movements discussed, we expect 
that participants in old and new issues protests will diverge, as follows. Relative to 
participants in movements around new issues, old movement participants should be more 
likely to be male owing to men’s traditionally greater participation in the labour force. They 
should also be more likely to belong to older generations i.e. the post-war generation since the 
class cleavage was most popular at their time of socialisation as well as  to be less highly 
educated given these movements tended to be more resource-poor. They should be less likely 
to be in professional or white collar employments since the movements tended to be more 
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working class; and also less likely to be unemployed or students since movements tended to 
be organised around trade unions, factories and other places of work. We would expect them 
to be more satisfied with democracy given the focus was more on the distribution of resources 
and less on post-material questions of self-expression as well as more leftist given the focus 
on socio-economic equality and the economic left-right value dimension. However, they 
should be less socially libertarian but more likely to be embedded in organizational networks 
given the links of the movement around trade unions and left-wing parties as opposed to the 
more horizontal, fluid structures of new social movements. We also expect them to be  more 
likely to engage via institutional means including voting, contacting politicians, etc. but less 
likely to engage in a variety of extra-institutional means such as occupations, direct action, 
etc. as these tend to be more closely linked to new social movements; more likely to 
demonstrate only more frequently  as new social movements tend to use a wider variety of 
extra-institutional tactics such as civil disobedience etc.   
 What about anti-austerity protests? To what extent do they resemble old, as opposed to 
new movements and to what extent are is their constituency more similar to that of protests 
around old issues compared to those around new issues? To address these research questions 
we compare anti-austerity protest participants to the other two groups and empirically analyse 
to which group they are more similar and to what extent – and on what dimensions – they 
differ from either.  
 
Data and Methods  
To answer these research questions, our analyses rely on data from an original dataset 
produced in the context of the Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation 
(Klandermans, Della Porta et al. 2009) project. This is a collaborative effort, funded by 
national funding agencies in each participating country coordinated through the European 
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Science Foundation (ESF), which involved nine countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and aimed at studying 
who participates in demonstrations, why, and how. To do so, national teams of researchers 
have conducted on-site surveys among participants in demonstrations. The robust and 
methodologically rigorous data collection procedures are explained in detail in van 
Stekelenburg, Walgrave et al. (2012). There have been a number of publications with data 
from the project, see for example Eggert and Giugni (2012) or Saunders, Grasso et al. (2012) 
and the other papers in the same issue of Mobilization. Moreover, face-to-face interviews 
(achieving an almost perfect response rate) were conducted with a sub-sample of respondents 
to allow for non-response bias checks on the mail-back surveys, thus ensuring a robust 
methodology and ensuring reliable results that are both representative and generalizable to the 
population of demonstration participants across Western Europe. 
The data are hierarchically structured, so as to lend themselves to multi-level analyses 
in which the individual-level data are nested into the country level. The dataset used in this 
analysis contains data from 72 demonstrations in seven Western European countries – 
Belgium, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland – containing over 
10,000 respondents.  The Appendix lists all the demonstrations included in the dataset and 
categorizes them by whether they are old, new or an austerity march, based on expert 
judgements, showing that the spread of issues is even, reflecting the fact that the project 
aimed to survey all large demonstrations (more than 3,000 estimated protesters) occurring in 
each participating country between 2009 and 2013. As mentioned previously, the 
demonstrations were categorized by expert research teams who had conducted the fieldwork 
and were familiar with the protests and organisers on the following basis:  (1) “old” issue 
protests: relating to the trade union and labour movement; (2) “new” issue protests: relating to 
culture and identity issues; (3) anti-austerity protests: emerging directly in reaction to 
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austerity measures and cuts enacted in the current period.  It should be noted of course that the 
same individuals may have attended different types of protests so we only generalise at the 
level of protest crowds (Diani 2015). 
 Additionally, the models include a number of variables to test difference between 
participants at the three types of protest: gender; we include a variable for cohorts or 
generations; education; SES; occupation; democratic satisfaction (a continuous scale where 0 
means very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the respondent’s country and 10 
means very satisfied) and political values – economic and social values – we constructed two 
scales using principal component analysis (in both cases the items loaded onto one component 
with eigenvalue greater than 1).  The first, for economic values is a mean scale of two Likert 
items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) ranging from 1 meaning Right and 5 meaning 
Left from two items: Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who 
are less well off. Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private 
enterprises. The second item was first recoded in reverse order so higher values signified a 
more left-wing position. The second scale for social values, is also a mean scale of two Likert 
items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) ranging from 1 meaning Authoritarian and 5 
meaning Libertarian from two items: Children should be taught to obey authority. People 
from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live in it permanently if 
they want to. The first item was first recoded in reverse order so higher values signified a 
more libertarian position.  
 Moreover, we include a variable for organizational membership (this is a continuous 
variable measuring the number of organizations that the respondent has been involved with in 
the past 12 months); a variable for institutional participation ( an additive scale from 0 to 4 
where 0 means the respondent engaged in no institutional activities and 4 means they engaged 
in all four.) Principal component analysis showed all four items loaded only on one 
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component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.5). This is derived from two questions. One 
asking individuals whether they voted at the last election, the other asking individuals the 
following question (the same one we used from the dependent variable for extra-institutional 
participation) and allowing individuals to select the activities they engaged in the last 12 
months: “There are many things that people can do to promote or prevent change. Have you, 
in the past 12 months…? contacted a politician; worn a badge or campaign sticker; donated 
money to a political campaign.”  
For extra-institutional activism, we created an additive scale where 0 means the 
respondent participated in none of these other extra-institutional activities and 6 means the 
respondent engaged in all six, based on responses to the question: “There are many things that 
people can do to promote or prevent change. Have you, in the past 12 months…? signed a 
petition? boycotted certain products? bought products for political, ethical or environmental 
reasons? joined a strike? taken part in direct action? used violent forms of action?” The results 
of principal component analysis also showed that all six items loaded on one component with 
an eigenvalue of 1.7; the only other component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 – of 1.3 – 
showed that the first three items had negative loadings and the other three had positive 
loadings highlighting the more confrontational nature of the latter three activities vis-a-vis the 
more mainstream first three). We also include a measure for frequency of protest in the last 12 
months.  
To accurately reflect the hierarchical nature of the data, and the fact that respondents 
were sampled within countries and therefore the fact that their errors are likely to be 
correlated, we apply two-level random-intercept models, with the country as the higher level 
of analysis. We present three logistic multi-level models. In the first one old and new 
movement participants are contrasted to each other so as to have a baseline against with to 
interpret the other two contrasts involving austerity participants. In the second one austerity 
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participants are contrasted to old movement protest participants. In the third one they are 
contrasted to new movement protest participants. 
 
Findings 
The analysis proceeds in two steps: in the first step we describe the composition of the three 
types of demonstrations according to a number of social, political, and other characteristics: in 
the second step we run logistic multi-level models with these variables in order to predict 
participation in anti-austerity movements. 
 Table 1 shows descriptives for old, new, and austerity movement participants. The 
first thing that is striking from the results is that, while there are clearly some differences, the 
profile of demonstrators at the three different types of protests is rather similar, confirming 
perhaps arguments over a “homogenization” across movements (Eggert and Giugni 2012).  
Anti-austerity movement participants have a profile similar to old movement participants on 
some aspects, while being more similar to new movement participants on other aspects. 
However, in general, austerity participants seem to be closer to the profile of old movement 
participants than to that of new movement participants. Compared to new protests, old 
movement protest and anti-austerity protests are similar in that they attract more men than 
women; more people with a lower educational qualification than in new protests; there are 
more working class people than in new protests; they have lower democratic satisfied 
constituencies than new protests; they are less socially libertarian than new protest 
constituencies; and less involved in various types of extra-institutional modes of action.   
Table 1 
  Anti-austerity protest participants are more similar to new movement participants 
compared to old movement participants in that their generational profile is younger and they 
are less embedded in organisations. As such it appears that anti-austerity protest participants 
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are similar in their profile to old movement protest participants in having higher proportions 
of less highly educated and more working class participants compared to new movement 
protest; they are also less democratically satisfied and less socially libertarian, less involved in 
extra-institutional modes compared to new movement participants; they are however younger 
and less organizationally embedded relative to old movement participants.  
However, we can also observe differences across the three types of movements. 
Participants in old, new, and austerity demonstrations do not look perfectly alike. For 
example, women are more present in new social movements that in both old and anti-austerity 
movements; anti-austerity movement participants are younger than new movement 
participants and especially than old movement participants; austerity participants seems 
slightly less educated than both of the other two movement participants; and the share of 
students is somewhat higher in the former than in the latter two. In terms of values, the most 
important differences can be observed on democratic satisfaction: anti-austerity movement 
participants are less satisfied than new movement participants (but equally interested than old 
movement participants). Finally, austerity participants are less prone to engage in both 
institutional and extra-institutional participation. These differences can be seen in further 
detail in the multi-level models below. It should be noted, however, that results might differ in 
part from the descriptive analyses as the samples used are not the same. 
Table 2 presents the results of three logistic multi-level models contrasting participants 
in old, new, and austerity demonstrations. While Table 1 presented descriptive statistics for 
the three groups these models allow us to test for significant differences while controlling for 
the other variables in the model. We first turn to Model 1 which addresses the differences 
between old and new movement participants. Compared to new movement participants, old 
movement participants are more male, more likely to come from older generations. They are 
less educated, more working class; less likely to be unemployed or students. This is in line 
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with new social movement theory, which has depicted the so-called social-cultural specialists 
– the core constituency of these movements – as being characterized precisely by such social 
characteristics contrasting them to people engaged in old movements, in particular the labor 
movement (Kriesi and Van der Praag 1987; Kriesi 1989; Kriesi 1993). This evidence shows 
that these two movement sectors are still different in many respects. Additionally, old 
movement participants are more dissatisfied with democracy, more highly economically left-
wing, more likely to be members of organizations, less likely to engage in other extra-
institutional activities, and more likely to protest more frequently. 
Table 2 
The main focus of our paper, however, is on anti-austerity demonstrations. So, the 
main question is: What characterizes participants in those demonstrations, as compared to 
both old and new movements? Let us have a look at each contrast in turn. The results for 
Model 2 show that anti-austerity movement participants differ from those from old 
movements on a number of important dimensions. They are more likely to come from the 
younger generations. They are more likely to be educated than old movement participants and 
more likely to be students. They are even more left-wing economically than old movement 
participants and more socially libertarian. They are less likely to be embedded in networks 
and to engage in institutional participation. However they are more likely than old movement 
participants to engage in other extra-institutional activities and to demonstrate more 
frequently.  
 Finally, Model 3 compares anti-austerity movement participants to new movement 
participants. Anti-austerity movement participants are more likely to be male. They tend to 
have more individuals from the generation coming of age in the 1980s but about as many of 
those coming of age in the 1990s/00s. They are significantly less educated than new 
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movement participants, more working class or students, they are less socially liberal than new 
movement participants, less likely to engage institutionally, but protest more frequently.  
 Taken together, the results from our models show that anti-austerity protests, like old 
movement protests, other than being more male-dominated than new movement protests, they 
are also less well-educated, less middle class, less socially liberal, and more frequently 
involved in protest. Anti-austerity participants are however less institutionally embedded than 
both old and new movement protest participants. As such, they are even more resource-poor 
than old movement constituencies. While old movements are strongly embedded with trade 
unions and parties, the new generation’s anti-austerity movement lacks the organizational 
basis and as such might explain their greater reliance on protest-events, hence the higher 
scores for frequency of political protest.  Moreover, while anti-austerity protests are populated 
by individuals from the younger generations, they are not younger in profile than protests 
around “new” issues.  While highly educated, this is slightly less so than the profile of new 
types of protest due perhaps to the higher proportion of full time students, i.e. individuals still 
completing education. There is no clear sign, at least in this data, that they are more likely to 
be members of a “precariat” (Della Porta 2015): most are in middle class occupations and 
they are not more likely to be unemployed than participants in old and new movements.   
They are also not particularly more democratically dissatisfied than other types of movement 
participants. So why democratic dissatisfaction might be a characteristic of protesters this 
appears not to be particularly distinctive to anti-austerity protesters (Calvo 2013). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
So what have we learned and where do these results take us? Anti-austerity demonstrations 
and movements form an important share of the extra-institutional contention that has occurred 
in the past few years. These movements and demonstrations have emerged in a historical 
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period characterized by one of the most profound economic crises Western Europe has ever 
experienced. Students of social movements have long argued that grievance theories do not 
hold and that protest is not linked – at least not directly – to situations of economic hardship 
and the social stress as well as the discontent stemming from them (McCarthy and Zald 1973; 
Tilly 1978). Anti-austerity mobilizations challenge understandings of the relationship between 
economic hardship and protest behavior. Resource mobilization and political process theories 
have gone far in this direction, showing convincingly how protest emerges from a good mix 
of endogenous (organization) and exogenous (political opportunities) conditions. However, as 
detailed in previous sections, the most recent developments have lead scholars to challenge 
the assumption that grievances do not matter. The emergence of anti-austerity protests in the 
past few years and their characteristics, including their social composition, call for further 
examination of the extent to which grievances and feelings of relative deprivation might help 
explain engagement in protest, and whether this vary from one type of movements to the 
other.   
 At the individual level of participation in social movements, this debate brings in the 
question of what is the “average” profile of participants – in terms of social characteristics, 
resources, political values, and extent of political engagement – of participants in different 
types of movements. More specifically, the characteristics of participants in anti-austerity 
movements need to be scrutinised in order to determine whether they resemble or differ from 
those of participants in other types of movements. Based on a unique dataset, in this paper we 
have examined the characteristics of participants in anti-austerity demonstrations, contrasting 
them to participants in demonstrations emanating, respectively, from old and new issues.  
 Our findings suggest that participants in anti-austerity demonstrations share more 
characteristics with old issue protests. However, similar does not mean identical. Important 
differences on key aspects could also be observed. To be sure, the Indignados, Occupy, and 
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other anti-austerity movements – similar to their precursor, namely the global justice 
movement – have displayed innovative forms of organizing and mobilizing (e.g. the use of 
Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks; social forums, participatory budgeting, and 
other forms of deliberative-participative democracy). Yet protesters at anti-austerity protests, 
while not particularly more “precarious,” do tend to be more resource-poor relative to those 
from new social movements.  
 It would seem that post-materialist theory is more useful for predicting participation in 
protests that tend to be less confrontational, ritualistic and have a constant supply, such as 
“national climate marches” for example. However, the economic crisis that started in 2008 as 
well as the austerity policies enacted by European governments seem to have brought to the 
streets young people which are more resource-poor relative to the usual suspects attending 
protests around “new” issues.  These findings remind us of the importance of the supply of 
protest and the distinction between protests around different issues: events such as 
government reducing pensions, public spending, student allowances, and so forth will 
provoke individuals to take to the streets against this perceived injustice. This type of event 
will attract a rather different crowd to the one that attends more ritualistic, peaceful 
demonstrative events. Therefore different types of protests have different dynamics and 
different types of social composition, value orientations, and action repertoire profiles that 
deserve future study. As other research on this topic has shown, context – including issue 
context – needs greater consideration in the study of protest participation (Giugni and Grasso 
2015). Our study comparing anti-austerity movement participants with those from old and 
new issue protests shows that an understanding of protest participation cannot be abstracted 
from context and issue. While voting happens every few years and people can join parties 
whenever they can, people only join a protest when it happens and only if its issue motivates 
them. Therefore supply is an important aspect of protest that should not be ignored in studies 
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of who engages and why. Studies that simply examine what variables impact on whether 
someone participates in a protest or not are agnostic to these factors and assume that the same 
dynamics underlie all protest participation. Comparing constituencies at different type of 
protests allowed us to show what these different underlying dynamics are that they vary by 
protest issue. We thus stress that future research should as much as possible try to take into 
account the type of protest issues.   
Our results show that issues matter.  Anti-austerity protests attract constituencies that 
are less well-educated and middle class than new issue demonstrations; at the same time, 
these constituencies are less organizationally embedded than those at old issue protests and so 
are more resource-poor even on the organizational level. They are more likely to be drawn 
from younger generations, and to be students. At such it appears that anti-austerity 
movements have brought new groups of young people to the streets to protest the current 
economic measures featuring spending cuts and welfare retrenchment in many European 
countries. These cuts are disproportionately more likely to hit the poorest sections of society.  
While it is unclear whether anti-austerity protesters took to the streets mainly to defend their 
own livelihoods or in solidarity with those poorer, hard-hit sectors of society – these new 
developments appear to have shifted back the focus from wider, moral, and cultural issues, 
back to the more bread-and-butter, redistributive concerns. Only the future will tell whether 
this signals a more long-term shift and whether the anti-austerity movement will able to 
articulate convincing progressive answers for a new era in order to move advanced 
democracies towards a more egalitarian, inclusive and sustainable social model of the future. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of old, new, and anti-austerity protest participants 
 
 Old New Anti-austerity 
Male 56%  45%  57%  
Generations                 
    Post-WWII generation  12%  9%  5%  
    1960s/70s generation 28%  23%  25%  
    1980s generation 23%  21%  25%  
    1990s/00s generation 37%  47%  45%  
Education       
    Secondary school or lower  39%  32%  40%  
    BA or equivalent 17%  24%  22%  
   MA or higher degree 45%  45%  37%  
Occupation       
    Salariat 56%  57%  50%  
    Intermediate professions 15%  15%  15%  
    Working class 10%  6%  11%  
    Unemployed 9%  7%  5%  
    Students 10%  15%  19%  
Democratic satisfaction (0-10)  4.5  5.0  4.5  
Economic values (left-wing) (1-5) 4.3  4.2  4.2  
Social values (libertarian) (1-5) 3.3  3.4  3.1  
Organizational membership  (1-4) 2.4  2.3  2.2  
Institutional participation (0-4) 2.4  2.4  1.9  
Extra-institutional participation (0-6) 2.5  2.7  2.3  
Frequency of demonstrating (1-5) 2.0  1.9  1.9  
Note: The cells without % are mean values. 
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Table 2: Logistic multi-level models predicting participation in three different types of 
movements 
 Old vs New Anti-austerity vs Old Anti-austerity vs New 
Fixed Effects       
Male 0.33**    
(0.07)        
 -0.07 
(0.09) 
 0.32*** 
(0.07) 
 
Cohorts                
     Post-WWII generation  0.10         
(0.12)         
 -0.44* 
(0.18)    
           -0.66*** 
(0.14) 
 
     Ref.: 1960s/70s generation 
 
      
    1980s generation -0.23*    
(0.11)         
 0.32** 
(0.12) 
 0.25** 
(0.09) 
 
    1990s/00s generation -0.58*** 
(0.10)        
 0.74*** 
(0.11) 
 0.07    
(0.09)        
 
Education       
     
    Ref.: Secondary school or lower  
 
      
    BA or equivalent -0.35** 
(0.11)         
 0.03    
(0.13) 
 -0.28** 
(0.09)       
 
   MA or higher degree -0.39*** 
(0.09)         
 0.24*   
(0.11) 
 -0.36*** 
(0.08)         
 
Occupation       
   Salariat -0.44** 
(0.14)         
 -0.23   
(0.15) 
    -0.54*** 
(0.12)         
 
   Intermediate professions -0.53***  
(0.16)         
 0.06    
(0.16) 
 -0.37** 
(0.14)        
 
   Ref.: Working class       
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   Unemployed -0.41*   
(0.18)         
 0.23    
(0.22) 
    0.08  
(0.18)         
 
   Students -0.38*  
(0.17)         
 0.54** 
(0.20) 
 0.43*** 
(0.15)      
 
Democratic satisfaction  0.04** 
(0.02)         
 -0.02    
(0.02) 
   -0.01    
(0.02) 
 
Economic values (left-wing) 0.63***  
(0.07)         
 0.29*** 
(0.06) 
 0.09  
(0.05)         
 
Social values (libertarian) -0.10     
(0.05) 
 0.13*        
(0.05) 
 -0.31*** 
(0.04)   
 
Organizational membership 0.14** 
 (0.04)        
   -0.10*   
(0.05)        
    -0.00 
(0.04)         
 
Institutional participation -0.01     
 (0.04) 
 -0.36***  
(0.05)               
    -0.28*** 
(0.04)         
 
Extra-institutional participation  -0.26*** 
(0.04)         
 0.20***    
(0.04)           
 -0.04   
(0.03)         
 
Frequency of demonstrating 0.24***  
(0.06)         
 0.22**          
(0.07)                
   0.34*** 
(0.06)         
 
Constant ߛ00  -2.98  
(2.08) 
  -3.01         
(2.97)   
 -1.05    
(2.90)         
 
 
Random Effects 
           
ı2u  27.78 53.51      51.37 
- Log Likelihood  -2437.15 -1761.51 -2916.67 
BIC 5042.06 3684.80        6003.58 
AIC 4912.30 3561.03 5871.34 
Groups 7 7 7 
N 6,832 4,986 7,786 
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Appendix: Demonstrations included in the analysis: coding based on expert judgments  
 
O= “old” movement issue protests; N= “new” movement issue protests; A= anti-austerity 
protests 
 
Belgium 
1. Antwerp, 1st of May March (2010): O 
2. Brussels, Climate Change (2009): N 
3. Brussels, March for Work (2010): A 
4. Brussels, No to Austerity (2010): A 
5. Brussels, No Government, Great Country (2011): N 
6. Brussels, Not in Our Name (2011): N 
7. Brussels, Non-Profit Demonstration (2011): A 
8. Brussels, We have alternatives (2011): A 
9. Brussels, Fukushima never again (2012): N 
 
Britain  
10. London, National Climate March (2009): N 
11. London, May Day Labour March (2010): O 
12. London, Take Back Parliament (2010): N 
13. London, No to Hate Crime Vigil (2010): N 
14. London, Unite Against Fascism National Demo (2010): N 
15. London, Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (2010): A 
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16. London, National Climate March 2010 (2010): N 
17. London, Second Student National Demo (2010):A  
18. London, Million Women Rise (2011): N 
19. London, 'TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (2011): O 
20. London, Occupy London (2011): A 
21. London, London Pride Parade (2012): N  
 
Italy  
22. Assisi, Marcia Perugia-Assisi (2011): N 
23. Bologna, Gay Pride (2012): N  
24. Firenze, Semi di giustizia, fiori di corresponsabilità (2013): N 
25. Florence, May Day (2011): O 
26. Florence, General Strike (2011): A    
27. Florence, Florence 10+10/Joining forces for another Europe (2012): A  
28. Milan, Euromayday (2011): N 
29. Niscemi, No Mous (2013): N  
30. Rome, No Monti Day (2012): A 
 
The Netherlands  
31. Amsterdam, Student demo 1 (2010): A 
32. Amsterdam, Culture demo Amsterdam (2010): A 
33. Amsterdam, Stop racism and exclusion (2011): N 
34. Amsterdam, Anti Nucleair demo (2011): N 
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35. Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Occupy Netherlands (2011): A 
36. Haarlem, Pink Saturday Parade Survey (2012): N 
37. Rotterdam, Retirement demonstration (2009): A 
38. The Hague, Together strong for public work (2011): A 
39. The Hague, Student demo 2 (2011): A 
40. The Hague, Military demo (2011): A 
41. The Hague, Stop budget cuts (care & welfare) (2011): A 
42. Utrecht, Climate demo (2009): N 
43. Utrecht, Culture demo Utrecht (2010): N 
 
Spain   
44. Barcelona, Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (2010): A 
45. Barcelona, Self-determination is democracy (2010): O 
46. Barcelona, We are a nation, we decide (2010): O 
47. Barcelona, 1st May, Labour Day (2010): O 
49. Madrid, Against Labor Law (2010): A 
50. Madrid, Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians and 
 bankers! (2011): A 
51. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against language decree (2010): O 
52. Santiago de Compostela, Demonstration against the new labour law (2010): O 
53. Vigo, Celebration May Day (2011): O 
54. Vigo, For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (2011): A 
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Sweden  
55. Copenhagen, Climate March (2009): N 
56. Gothenburg, May Day (Left Party) (2012): N 
57. Gothenburg, May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (2012): O 
58. Gothenburg, Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival) (2012): N 
59. Malmö, May Day (Left Party) (2011): N 
60. Malmö, May Day (SAP/LO) (2011): O 
61. Stockholm, May 1 March, Left Party (2010): N 
62. Stockholm, Against racist politics (2010): N 
63. Stockholm, May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (2010): O 
64. Stockholm, Anti-nuclear demonstration (2011): N 
 
Switzerland  
65. Bern, World March of Women (2010): N 
66. Beznau, Anti Nuclear Manifestation (2011): N    
67. Geneva, Gay Pride Geneva (2011): N  
68. Geneva, Women demonstration Geneva (2011): N  
69. Geneva, May 1ste demonstration 2011 (2011): O 
70. Mühleberg, Anti-nuclear (2012): N 
71. Zurich, May 1st Demonstration (2010): O   
72. Zurich, Pride demonstration (2012): N 
 
 
